Do long-term bonds hedge equity risk? Evidence from Spain.  Working Paper N275-16 by Flavin, Thomas & Lagoa-Varela, Dolores
 
Department of Economics Finance & Accounting 
________________ 
 
Working Paper N275-16 
 
Do long-term bonds hedge equity risk? Evidence from Spain 
 
Thomas J. Flavina,* , Dolores Lagoa-Varelab 
aDepartment of Economics, Finance and Accounting, Maynooth University, Ireland 
  bUniversidad La Coruña, Spain 
 
Abstract 
We analyze the relationship between returns on equity and long-term government bonds in the 
Spanish economy. In particular, we are interested in the stability of the relationship across 
differing market conditions and if long-term bonds deliver diversification benefits during 
periods of equity market turbulence. Employing a Markov-switching vector autoregression 
model with three regimes, we find that the Spanish stock-bond relationship varies across market 
conditions and is positively correlated during ‘Bear’ markets. A sectoral analysis reveals that 
two sectors – Financials and Oil & Gas – are responsible for this positive comovement with the 
former being relatively more important. 
 
Keywords: Stock-bond relationship; diversification; Spanish financial markets. 
JEL Classification: G01 
 
                                                 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +353 1 7083369; fax: +353 1 7083934. 
Email addresses:thomas.flavin@nuim.ie (T.J. Flavin); dlagoa@udc.es (D. Lagoa-Varela). 
 1 
1. Introduction 
 The stock-bond relationship is an important determinant of investors’ portfolio 
choice. Long-term investors typically hold positive positions in both equity and 
government bonds despite stock returns out-performing bond returns over the long 
term. The main incentive for holding bonds appears to be for their potential 
diversification benefits. For example, Brennan and Xia (2000) and Campbell and 
Viceira (2001, 2002) all show that when allocating funds between U.S. equities and 
bonds, the demand for long-term bonds increases with both the investment horizon and 
the risk aversion of the investor. 
 The relationship between stock and bond returns has been extensively studied 
for the U.S. The early literature suggests that long-term bonds provide a good hedge or 
act as a ‘safe haven’ for equity investors. For example, Fleming et al. (1998) and 
Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) both find that stock market shocks elicit little 
response in measures of bond market risk. More recently, studies such as Baele et al. 
(2010) document substantial time-variation in the co-movements of stocks and bonds. 
One popular explanation is that the time-varying relationship depends on market 
conditions and that during episodes of stock market turbulence, there is a ‘flight-to-
safety’ reaction whereby investors flee equity markets and take refuge in relatively safe 
assets, such as government bonds. Evidence consistent with this is provided by 
Connolly et al. (2005), Guidolin and Timmermann (2006), Anderson et al. (2008), Yang 
et al. (2009) and Flavin et al. (2014) among others, who all report a negative stock-bond 
relationship during equity market declines. This supports the view that government 
bonds provide an effective hedge against equity risk 
This relationship also seems to hold during periods of financial market 
turbulence in non-U.S. markets. For example, Baur and Lucey (2009) find negative 
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stock-bond correlations during equity market downturns for eight developed markets, 
while Chang and Hsueh (2013) confirm this finding for a group of Asia-Pacific 
countries. However, during the most recent financial crisis, a different pattern has begun 
to emerge for some of the Eurozone periphery countries. Jammazi et al. (2015) find a 
positive stock-bond relationship in Spain, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Belgium since 
the beginning of the European sovereign debt crisis in late 2009. They attribute this to 
investors moving away from stock and government bond markets of peripheral 
countries to invest in economies with more solid fundamentals. Similarly, Acosta-
González et al. (2016) report that, during the recent crisis, the correlation between bond 
and stock returns inverted from negative to positive in countries like Italy and Spain, 
while Flavin (2016), using a similar methodology to that employed here, finds positive 
co-movement between stock and bond returns in the crisis-hit peripheral Eurozone 
states during the most recent crisis.  These studies imply that bonds may not always act 
as a safe haven for equity investors. 
 We re-visit this issue and focus on Spain. We choose Spain in an effort to 
explain the recent evidence of a positive stock-bond relationship during the crisis. 
While a single-country study may sacrifice geographical coverage, it allows us to delve 
deeper into the driving forces behind this change in stock-bond co-movement and apply 
a new methodology to a sectoral analysis of Spanish financial markets. Specifically we 
analyse the relationship for Spain using a Markov-switching vector autoregression 
(MS-VAR) model which allows us to assess the time-variation in the conditional 
correlation across market conditions. Furthermore, we generate regime-specific 
impulse response functions (IRFs) to study changes in the dynamics of the relationship 
across regimes. The analysis is conducted for the equity market index and at a finer 
level of disaggregation using ten sectoral indices. Our results confirm the 
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aforementioned pattern at the market level, i.e. domestic long-term bonds and equity 
are positively correlated during stock market downturns. However, the sectoral analysis 
reveals that this result is mainly driven by two sectors – Financials and Oil & Gas – 
with returns on most other sectors displaying negative or zero co-movement with long-
term bonds during bear markets. Given their relative size and the duration of their 
shocks, we argue that the Financial sector is relatively more important in explaining the 
stock-bond relationship at the overall market level.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the 
econometric methodology and our data. Section 3 presents our empirical results and 
discusses their implications, while section 4 contains our concluding remarks. 
 
2. Econometric Methodology and Data 
2.1 Econometric model: specification and estimation 
We estimate bivariate MS-VAR models to study the time-varying relationship 
between Spanish equities and long-term government bonds. We specify the vector of 
dependent variables as yt ={equity return, bond return}t. The bond return is always the 
return on a 10-year sovereign bond but we employ different measures of the equity 
return in each model. Initially we focus on the total equity market index and then repeat 
the analysis at the sectoral level to provide a more disaggregated assessment of the 
relationship between Spanish equity and bond returns. 
We study the stability of shock transmission across regimes by analyzing 
regime-dependent IRFs.1 These allow us to study both the contemporaneous response 
of the asset returns to a stock market shock and the stability of the dynamics of shocks 
across regimes. As we primarily interested in the ability of government bonds to hedge 
                                                 
1 Ehrmann et al. (2003) show how to generate regime-dependent IRFs in a Markov-switching VAR. 
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equity market risk, we order the variables so that the equity return affects both variables 
contemporaneously but bond market shocks only affect the stock market variable with 
a time lag. Given that stock market shocks are usually larger in magnitude and more 
frequent, we prefer to allow them have an immediate influence on both variables. 
 In our models, we allow for up to three distinct regimes, which we identify as 
‘Bull’, ‘Normal’ and ‘Bear’ market conditions. As in Guidolin and Timmermann 
(2005), we find that two regimes are not sufficient to capture the market dynamics and 
hence opt for the higher dimension specification. 
We estimate the following MS-VAR model: 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆(𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝(𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡)𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝 +
𝑝𝑝
1 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡   (1) 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ∈ {1,2,3} 
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡~𝑖𝑖. 𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑. (0,𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠2) 
where yt is a 2x1 vector as defined above. The regression constant (λ), the matrix of 
autoregressive coefficients (θ) and the covariance matrix of residuals (σ) are all regime-
dependent. St is an unobservable latent variable, which takes a value of unity in ‘Bull’ 
markets, a value of 2 in ‘Normal’ market conditions and a value of 3 in ‘Bear’ markets. 
The evolution of the unobserved regime path is specified to be Markov switching and 
is endogenously determined by the data. The conditional matrix of transition 
probabilities has the following typical element: 
ijtt pjSiS === − ]|[Pr 1     (2) 
The model is estimated using a Bayesian Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
approach. We first specify the prior distributions for the parameters. For the variances, 
we employ a Wishart distribution, the VAR coefficients have a flat prior and we use a 
weak Dirichlet prior for the transitions, with a preference towards remaining in the same 
state. Using Gibbs sampling, we estimate the parameters and regimes in the following 
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sequence; 
Step 1: We draw the sigmas, given the mean coefficients and regimes.  
Step 2: We draw the mean coefficients (λ and θ) given sigmas and regimes. 
Step 3: We draw the regimes, given the sigmas and mean coefficients. 
Step 4: We draw the transition parameters. 
This sequence of steps is repeated 10,000 times after discarding an initial ‘burn-
in’ set of 2000 replications. From the estimated parameters, we generate the regime-
dependent IRFs and their associated confidence bands. The IRFs are the Choleski 
factors standardized to unit variances. This allows us to compare differences in 
dynamics rather than differences in variances, since what we are interested in is the 
stability of the shock transmission across regimes. 
 
2.2 Data 
 Our data set consists of daily returns on Spanish equities and long-term 
government bonds. We employ Datastream-constructed total return indices for both the 
equity market (TOTMKES) and 10-year government bonds (BMES10Y). Later, we 
disaggregate the equity index into ten sectors. These are based on the FTSE’s Industry 
Classification Benchmark and the sectors are Financials, Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, 
Industrials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Telecoms, Technology, Utilities and 
Healthcare. Our sample covers the period from January 1st, 2004 to December 31st, 
2015. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all return series. Panels A and B refer 
to the market-level and sectoral returns respectively. Panel A reveals that, over the 
sample period, the mean returns on equities and the 10-year bond are roughly the same, 
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while the stock market index displays far greater volatility. In risk-return terms, bonds 
proved to be a much more attractive investment over the period. Both series are 
positively skewed and exhibit significant levels of kurtosis. 
There are striking differences across the sectoral indices. Technology is the only 
sector to record a negative mean return but returns in the Financial, Oil & Gas, 
Telecoms and Basic Materials sectors are all below the overall market average. The 
poor performance of these sectors is further compounded by relatively high levels of 
risk, especially for Financial and Technology firms. In contrast, firms operating in the 
Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Healthcare and Utilities sectors all outperform 
the market in terms of returns and have relatively low risk levels. The consumer goods 
sector is clearly the most stable sector in the Spanish equity market.  
All sectoral returns exhibit skewness and strong evidence of kurtosis. With the 
exception of the Financial sector, all returns are negatively skewed. The prevalence of 
fat tails suggests that modeling these returns in a Markov-switching framework may be 
a better approach than in a single state setting.  
 
3. Discussion of results 
3.1 Results of the MS-VAR model 
Bivariate MS-VAR models are estimated for the long-term sovereign bond 
return and the returns on each of the Spanish stock market indices described above. In 
all applications, we find that a three-regime specification is preferable to a more 
parsimonious representation. We identify the regimes from the estimated volatilities 
and they correspond to ‘Bull’, ‘Normal’ and ‘Bear’ phases of market dynamics. ‘Bull’ 
markets are characterized by positive growth and low volatility, ‘Bear’ regimes by 
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negative returns and high volatility and ‘Normal’2 conditions combine zero returns with 
an intermediate level of volatility. 
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
Tables 2 and 3 contain regime-specific estimates of expected returns and 
volatilities respectively, for both equities (all indices) and the 10-year government 
bond. The long-term bond generates positive expected returns (Table 2) across all three 
regimes, suggesting that volatility in the financial system is coming mainly from the 
equity markets. ‘Bull’ markets have positive expected returns for all equity indices; 
‘Normal’ markets have approximately zero expected equity returns; while ‘Bear’ 
markets exhibit large negative stock returns. The largest declines are recorded in the 
Oil & Gas, Utilities and Industrial sectors. In general, the magnitude of returns in the 
‘Bear’ regime is the largest but they are often imprecisely estimated due to increased 
volatility in the system. Focusing on results for the total equity-bond pairing reveals 
that both the expected bond return falls in the ‘Bear’ regime, indicating that both 
markets were suffering financial distress. Common factors such as liquidity shortages 
are likely to have played a role in both markets. 
The asset volatilities (Table 3) confirm some stylized facts. Across all sectors, 
stock market returns are more volatile than returns in the bond market in all regimes. 
Furthermore, the volatility increases are far more pronounced for equity returns than 
bond returns as we move from ‘Bull’ to ‘Normal’ to ‘Bear’ regimes. The Telecoms and 
Technology sectors are the most volatile sectors during ‘Bull’ and ‘Normal’ regimes 
but these are surpassed by the Financial and Oil & Gas sectors during the ‘Bear’ regime. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, this could be referred to as a ‘stagnation’ regime as the returns are very close to, and 
never statistically significantly different from, zero. 
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Figure 1 presents the smoothed probabilities of the regimes for the market-level 
analysis.3 It shows the prevailing financial market conditions over the sample period. 
The initial period is a clear ‘Bull’ market regime, associated with strong stock market 
and economic growth. This is interspersed with short periods of ‘Normal’ market 
conditions before the first transition to a ‘Bear’ regime in late 2008 as the U.S. credit 
crisis transmitted to international markets following the collapse of Lehman Brothers.4 
‘Normal’ conditions were re-established before the most prolonged ‘Bear’ period in 
2011 when Spain looked likely to be drawn into the developing Eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis. ‘Bear’ regimes tend to be less persistent than other regimes but are 
associated with falling returns and increasing uncertainty. The sample ends in a mainly 
‘Normal’ regime with some sporadic spurts of growth. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 reports ‘Duration’ and ‘Frequency’ statistics for the three regimes 
across all models. ‘Duration’ (measured in days) captures the average time for which 
each state persists, while ‘Frequency’ measures the proportion of time that the system 
spends in each of the regimes. Consistent with Figure 1, we find that ‘Bear’ markets 
have relatively short duration – about 7 days in the case of the market index – and most 
often account for the shortest proportion of time. On average, across sectors, a high-
volatility shock persists for nearly 10 days but ranges from 4 days in the case of 
Consumer Goods to 17 days in the model for Consumer Services. The latter also 
experiences the most protracted ‘Bear’ regime and spends about 41% of the sample 
period in this tumultuous state. At the other extreme, Oil & Gas spends just 9% of the 
time in the highest-volatility state and shocks die out after about 5 days. We already 
                                                 
3 Similar graphs are available for each application of the model and are available upon request. 
However to conserve space, we do not include the graphs for the sectors. 
4 Aït-Sahalia et al. (2009) attribute (in part) the ‘internationalization’ of the U.S. crisis to liquidity 
shortages following the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2010. 
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noted that this sector exhibited very high volatility during the bear regime so these 
regimes are short, rare but intense.  
Given the prolonged period of economic growth that preceded the bust, ‘Bull’ 
markets prevail for a great deal of time, especially for the Telecom, Utilities and 
Consumer Goods sectors. Positive shocks are persistent, with a duration of about 19 
and 37 days for the total market and the financial sector, respectively. ‘Normal’ regime 
shocks persist for between 12-19 days across sectors and their frequency varies greatly 
across sectors. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 presents estimates of the transition probabilities for the total market and 
each sector, with pij denoting the probability of moving from regime j to i. All regimes 
are quite persistent, especially ‘Bull’ and ‘Normal’ states. For example, in the total 
market-bond application, the probability of remaining in the ‘Bull’ or ‘Normal’ regime, 
given that is where you were one period ago, is 0.946 and 0.927 respectively. ‘Bear’ 
regimes are slightly less persistent, with a corresponding probability of staying in this 
state of 0.861. 
Continuing to focus on the total market specification, we find that having started 
in ‘Bull’ regime, the financial system is more likely to transit to a ‘Normal’ rather than 
a ‘Bear’ regime (i.e. p21 > p31). Upon leaving the ‘Normal’ regime, the probabilities of 
moving to a ‘Bull’ or ‘Bear’ regime are roughly equal, while a movement out of a ‘Bear’ 
regime has a higher probability of being to a ‘Normal’ rather than a ‘Bull’ regime. This 
pattern is replicated for the sectoral analysis of Financials and Oil & Gas. The other 
sectors are more likely to make larger jumps between regimes with movements between 
extreme regimes relatively more common, with movements out of ‘Bull’ and ‘Bear’ 
regimes often tending to bypass the ‘Normal’ regime. For example, both the Telecom 
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and Technology sectors have much greater probability of moving from a ‘Bear’ to a 
‘Bull’ rather a ‘Normal’ regime, (i.e. p13 > p23).  
 
3.2 Regime-specific correlations. 
Table 6 presents the regime-specific correlations generated by the MS-VAR 
model. Though not a statistical test for the stability of relationships, they provide an 
overview of the changes in comovement between the three regimes. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
A number of interesting features of the relationship emerge from this analysis. Firstly, 
‘Bull’ markets are predominantly associated with negative comovement between the 
two asset classes. The only exception is the Telecom sector which displays small but 
positive correlation with the long-term government bond. For all other sectors, equity 
and bond returns tend to move in opposite directions during periods of positive stock 
market news as investors re-balance portfolios in favor of the high-yielding asset. 
Secondly, during ‘Normal’ market conditions, the correlations all turn positive, 
implying that returns to both assets move in the same direction in response to shocks 
during this relatively stagnant period. Thirdly, the sign of the correlation is not uniform 
across stock market sectors during ‘Bear’ regimes. Returns to the total Spanish stock 
market index and the long-term bond are positively correlated. As ‘Bear’ regimes are 
characterised by negative shocks, this suggests that Spanish bonds do not act as ‘safe-
havens’ for investors in the Spanish equity market. However, our sectoral analysis 
reveals some heterogeneity in the comovements, with only Financials and Oil & Gas 
exhibiting this tendency for positive comovement during ‘Bear’ markets. For the other 
eight sectors, there is a negative stock-bond correlation. 
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3.3 Impulse Response Functions – transmission of cross-market shocks 
Thus far, the analysis suggests that bonds have some diversification benefits for 
equity investors but their effectiveness varies across sectors of the equity market. We 
require a more thorough statistical investigation of the stock-bond relationship across 
different market conditions. Regime-dependent IRFs, as proposed by Ehrmann et al. 
(2003), are ideally suited to show the changes (and their statistical significance) in the 
transmission of structural shocks across different market conditions. We present these 
here to analyze the transmission of shocks and their cross-market effects. The IRFs 
allow us to analyze the sign of the responses in each regime and changes in the 
dynamics of the relationship across regimes. 
 
3.3.1 Market-level analysis 
Firstly, we focus on the total equity market and the long-term sovereign bond 
relationship. Figure 2 presents the IRFs, with 95% confidence bands. The top row of 
each figure shows the bond market reaction to a stock market shock, while the bottom 
row illustrates the stock market reaction to a bond market shock. The columns represent 
the market regime 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The bond market reacts negatively (opposite in sign) to the equity market shock during 
‘Bull’ market conditions. This is consistent with investors liquidating bond portfolios 
to increase their exposure to the equity market in pursuit of increased returns. While the 
contemporaneous shock exerts a negative and statistically significant effect on the bond 
market, the shock quickly dies out and the dynamics are not statistically different from 
zero.  
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 Bond markets, during the ‘Normal’ regime, respond differently. Now the 
contemporaneous reaction is positive (of the same sign) and stays in the system for 
about one day. During such market conditions, investors don’t seem to alter the 
composition of their portfolios. 
 ‘Bear’ market episodes are still associated with a positive contemporaneous 
shock. This is consistent with the earlier results on the regime-dependent correlations 
and confirms the aforementioned results of Jammazi et al. (2015), Acosta-González et 
al. (2016) and Flavin (2016) for the Spanish market. The reaction to the shock is more 
persistent than in the other regimes and although it turns negative (while remaining 
statistically different from zero) on days 2-4 after the shock, the sum of the reactions is 
positive, suggesting that overall the diversification benefits of sovereign bonds are 
limited following an equity market shock.  
 Focusing on the lower row, we find that across all regimes, a bond market shock 
elicits little reaction from the stock market. In general, the responses are not statistically 
significant and there is little evidence of feedback effects from the sovereign bond to 
the stock market. Hence, we infer that bond market shocks have little impact on equity 
investors. 
 
3.3.2 Sectoral-level analysis 
 The market-level result is at odds with the extant literature, which generally 
finds that long-term sovereign bonds act as a ‘safe-haven’ asset for equity investors 
during stock market crises. To shed more light on the stock-bond relationship for the 
Spanish financial system, we conduct our analysis at a finer level of disaggregation 
using ten stock market sectoral indices. Figure 3 shows the IRFs. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
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 The sectoral analysis produces a number of noteworthy results. Firstly, there is 
a great deal of uniformity in the bond market response to an equity shock across all 
sectors during both ‘Bull’ and ‘Normal’ regimes. During the low-volatility ‘Bull’ state, 
there is a negative contemporaneous response in the sovereign bond market following 
a shock to any one of nine sectors, consistent with our total market response above. The 
only exception is recorded for an Industrial sector shock which elicits a positive, but 
not statistically distinguishable from zero, response in the government debt market. The 
magnitude of the response is relatively small in this regime and shocks die out quickly. 
In most cases, their influence is limited to the initial day. 
 A similarly consistent pattern emerges during the ‘Normal’ regime, even though 
the bond market response is of the opposite sign. A shock to any equity market sector 
generates a positive response in the bond market and its magnitude ranges from 0.025 
to 0.28. Shocks are a little more persistent relative to the ‘Bull’ market but generally 
their influence has dissipated within 3-4 days.  
 Secondly, the high-volatility ‘Bear’ regime is where the sectoral analysis 
provides most insight into the total market behavior. The earlier finding that Spanish 
equity and sovereign bond returns were positively correlated during market downturns 
appears to be driven by just two sectors; namely Financials and Oil & Gas. Furthermore, 
shocks to both of these sectors exhibit more persistence during the ‘Bear’ market than 
in other market conditions. Given their relative size5 (see Figure 4), it seems that 
Financials are the main cause of this positive comovement during the crisis episode. 
This is consistent with the argument that, generally, financial crashes lead to debt crises 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011) and that, specifically, during the most recent crisis, 
                                                 
5 Over our sample period, Financials dominate the Spanish market. On average, they account for 34% 
of total market capitalization over this period. Oil & Gas accounts for about 6.3% on average. Thus the 
Financial sector is about 5 times larger than the Oil & Gas sector. 
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difficulties in the domestic banking sector caused price declines and increased 
uncertainty for domestic sovereign bonds (see Acharya et al., 2014; and Mody and 
Sandri, 2012). Our evidence shows that shocks to the domestic financial sector exerted 
an adverse influence on the market for Spanish government debt. The bailout of the 
Bankia group in December 2010 and its subsequent partial nationalization in May 2012 
saw a transfer of banking debts and risks to the sovereign, thus inextricably linking the 
banking sector and government debt. The increased fiscal burden on the Spanish 
government led to an increased risk premium on sovereign debt. The simultaneous 
declines were likely further exacerbated by the banks’ relatively large holdings of 
domestic debt, thereby reinforcing the ‘doom loop’ of banks and sovereign debt.  
A shock to the Oil & Gas sector generates a similar response in the bond market, 
but it is worth recalling that the ‘Bear’ regime for this sector has the shortest duration 
and lowest frequency so that coupled with its size, it is likely to wield less influence on 
the overall market behavior relative to the Financial sector. The positive comovement 
between the returns of the Oil & Gas sector and sovereign bonds may be attributed to 
two features of this market. Firstly, Spanish energy markets are heavily regulated, with 
the state assuming responsibility for mechanisms to cover any income shortfalls of 
energy providers. The so-called ‘déficit de tarifa’ means that adverse shocks for this 
sector also impact on the sovereign who have to meet greater funding requirements. 
The coincidence of this ‘Bear’ regime with an already sensitive period in Eurozone 
sovereign debt markets contributes to the positive comovement. Secondly, the Spanish 
Oil & Gas sector is almost totally dependent on imports. The International Energy 
Agency (2014) reports that both Oil and Gas imports constitute approximately 99% of 
domestic consumption. With imports being predominantly sourced outside the Euro 
zone, this sector is highly vulnerable to exchange rate risk. The Euro zone sovereign 
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debt crisis weakened the euro on foreign exchange markets meaning that there was a 
strong link between the falling bond prices and the stock prices on the import-reliant 
Oil and Gas sector. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
Shocks to the other eight stock market sectors generate a more homogeneous 
response in the bond market. The contemporaneous reaction is small but negative and 
exhibits little persistence. Bond markets are not very sensitive to events in these sectors 
during stock market downturns. This is consistent with the empirical evidence from 
non-crisis countries. Thus, sovereign bonds still offer diversification benefits for equity 
investments in these eight sectors but such benefits are limited for holders of stocks in 
the Financial and Oil & Gas sectors. 
An examination of the feedback effects from a bond market shock to the stock 
market sectors reveals that there are little or no such effects in ‘Bull’ or ‘Normal’ 
markets. During ‘Bear’ regimes, there is some limited evidence of statistically 
significant feedback effects to the Financials, Basic Materials, Healthcare, Telecoms 
and Utilities sectors on the day after a bond market shock. These effects are short lived 
with none persisting for more than a single day. 
 In summary, the sectoral analysis shows that the bond market response to an 
equity market shock is homogeneous during more benign market conditions but 
becomes more heterogeneous during stock market downturns. The positive correlation 
between returns on the total stock market and long-term sovereign bonds during ‘Bear’ 
markets appears to be mainly driven by the Financials sector, and the Oil & Gas sector 
to a lesser extent. It is consistent with the transfer of previously private banking debts 
to the sovereign during the bailout and recapitalization programs extended to impaired 
domestic banks by the government. Sovereign bonds do not provide a good hedge for 
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the risks of these sectors as their risks tend to transfer to government during crisis 
periods.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 We examine the stock-bond relationship for Spain and consider the ability of 
long-term government bonds to hedge against equity market risk. The recent literature 
suggests that Spain is different to other big developed financial markets in that returns 
to equity and sovereign bonds are positively correlated during a stock market crisis and 
hence bonds offer limited diversification benefits to equity investors. Employing a MS-
VAR model, we confirm this result for the total market. However, a sectoral analysis 
sheds greater light on the driving force behind this finding. In fact, just two sectors – 
Financials and Oil & Gas – appear to generate this positive comovement at the market 
level. Given the relative size of the sectors and the relative frequency and duration of 
their adverse shocks, we posit that the Financial sector is predominantly responsible for 
this positive correlation. Two-way feedbacks between domestic banks and sovereign 
debt markets served to amplify the initial financial disturbance through the transfer of 
banking debts and risks to the sovereign during the crisis and relatively large holdings 
of domestic government by the banking sector. This meant that the fortunes of the 
banking sector and sovereign debt instruments became inextricably linked and that 
sovereign bonds were no longer suitable ‘safe-haven’ assets for holders of financial 
stocks. 
 Shocks to the other stock market sectors do not impact greatly on sovereign 
bonds during episodes of high market volatility. Bond reactions tend to be small, 
negative and display little persistence, thus making bonds a suitable hedge for investors 
in these equity market sectors.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean  Volatility Skewness Kurtosis 
Panel A 
Equity Market 0.0255 1.3332 0.0345 5.9083 
10-year Bond 0.0259 0.4833 0.9671 15.3000 
Panel B 
Financials 0.0094 1.7869 0.3592 8.7324 
Basic Materials 0.0193 1.4335 -0.1820 3.4578 
Industrials 0.0315 1.3331 -0.3150 3.6935 
Consumer Goods 0.0404 0.8848 -0.0641 8.5577 
Consumer Services 0.0565 1.4619 0.1580 4.0571 
Telecoms 0.0201 1.4562 -0.0545 5.6547 
Technology -0.0123 1.6872 -1.4511 28.3445 
Utilities 0.0420 1.3401 -0.0761 7.3695 
Healthcare 0.0518 1.3511 -0.6001 7.6829 
Oil & Gas 0.0097 1.5794 -0.3471 6.1392 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the daily percentage returns on the total 
stock market index, the 10-year government bond, and the sectoral equity indices used in the 
study.  
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Table 2: Estimates of Expected Returns across Regimes 
 
 
10-year bond with 
Expected Return 
Bull Market Normal Market Bear Market 
µE µB µE µB µE µB 
Total Equity 
Market 
0.161 
(0.026) 
0.016 
(0.009) 
-0.034 
(0.038) 
0.028 
(0.012) 
-0.213 
(0.141) 
0.013 
(0.050) 
Financials 0.126 
(0.025) 
0.014 
(0.008) 
-0.013 
(0.043) 
0.036 
(0.011) 
-0.132 
(0.154) 
0.013 
(0.041) 
Basic Materials 0.153 
(0.032) 
0.023 
(0.008) 
-0.081 
(0.065) 
0.005 
(0.037) 
-0.217 
(0.084) 
0.031 
(0.017) 
Industrials 0.160 
(0.024) 
0.029 
(0.008) 
-0.044 
(0.060) 
0.013 
(0.032) 
-0.236 
(0.090) 
0.031 
(0.017) 
Consumer Goods 0.071 
(0.016) 
0.024 
(0.008) 
-0.019 
(0.036) 
0.007 
(0.031) 
0.021 
(0.078) 
0.043 
(0.023) 
Consumer 
Services 
0.153 
(0.024) 
0.021 
(0.008) 
0.061 
(0.077) 
0.018 
(0.037) 
-0.030 
(0.057) 
0.032 
(0.012) 
Telecoms 0.081 
(0.024) 
0.024 
(0.007) 
-0.128 
(0.093) 
-0.009 
(0.041) 
-0.158 
0.125 
0.042 
(0.029) 
Technology 0.080 
(0.026) 
0.016 
(0.007) 
-0.104 
(0.085) 
0.006 
(0.037) 
-0.195 
(0.114) 
0.064 
(0.021) 
Utilities 0.112 
(0.019) 
0.027 
(0.007) 
-0.013 
(0.070) 
0.011 
(0.034) 
-0.273 
(0.135) 
0.032 
(0.026) 
Healthcare 0.118 
(0.025) 
0.027 
(0.008) 
0.116 
(0.054) 
0.024 
(0.031) 
-0.134 
(0.073) 
0.026 
(0.015) 
Oil & Gas 0.103 
(0.027) 
0.023 
(0.007) 
-0.022 
(0.055) 
0.020 
(0.016) 
-0.355 
(0.245) 
0.019 
(0.077) 
Notes: This Table presents the expected returns, generated by the estimated model, for 
equities (µE) and the 10-year government bond (µB) in each of the regimes. The numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors. 
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Table 3: Estimates of Volatilities across Regimes 
 
 
10-year bond with 
Volatilities 
Bull Market Normal Market Bear Market 
𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸2 𝜎𝜎𝐵𝐵2 𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸2 𝜎𝜎𝐵𝐵2 𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸2 𝜎𝜎𝐵𝐵2 
Total Equity 
Market 
0.370 
(0.027) 
0.055 
(0.003) 
1.571 
(0.097) 
0.160 
(0.009) 
6.274 
(0.566) 
0.879 
(0.083) 
Financials 0.512 
(0.029) 
0.059 
(0.003) 
2.346 
(0.116) 
0.141 
(0.008) 
10.936 
(0.910) 
0.773 
(0.063) 
Basic Materials 0.771 
(0.046) 
0.069 
(0.003) 
1.861 
(0.143) 
0.694 
(0.054) 
4.717 
(0.323) 
0.184 
(0.012) 
Industrials 0.642 
(0.033) 
0.072 
(0.004) 
1.982 
(0.133) 
0.654 
(0.046) 
4.284 
(0.299) 
0.143 
(0.009) 
Consumer Goods 0.336 
(0.021) 
0.076 
(0.004) 
0.711 
(0.050) 
0.644 
(0.051) 
2.508 
(0.279) 
0.156 
(0.019) 
Consumer 
Services 
0.464 
(0.032) 
0.060 
(0.003) 
2.714 
(0.201) 
0.708 
(0.066) 
3.537 
(0.199) 
0.145 
(0.036) 
Telecoms 0.908 
(0.049) 
0.077 
(0.004) 
3.492 
(0.285) 
0.737 
(0.073) 
5.155 
(0.619) 
0.238 
(0.056) 
Technology 0.901 
(0.052) 
0.072 
(0.004) 
3.692 
(0.264) 
0.732 
(0.067) 
7.284 
(0.746) 
0.185 
(0.016) 
Utilities 0.627 
(0.027) 
0.078 
(0.003) 
2.648 
(0.191) 
0.698 
(0.054) 
6.079 
(0.653) 
0.195 
(0.017) 
Healthcare 0.600 
(0.040) 
0.067 
(0.004) 
1.683 
(0.116) 
0.646 
(0.046) 
3.875 
(0.260) 
0.141 
(0.009) 
Oil & Gas 0.825 
(0.059) 
0.067 
(0.003) 
2.793 
(0.255) 
0.209 
(0.023) 
10.388 
(1.627) 
1.095 
(0.170) 
Notes: This Table presents the regime-specific variances, generated by the estimated model, 
for equities (σ2E) and the 10-year government bond (σ2B). The numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors. 
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Table 4. Characteristics of regimes   
 
 Duration  Frequency  
Bull Normal Bear Bull Normal Bear  
Equity Market 18.6 13.7 7.3 36.9 49.7 13.4 
Financials 37.5 18.9 8.7 32.7 50.6 16.7 
Basic Materials 23.3 15.6 13.5 54.8 18.5 26.7 
Industrials 20.7 13.6 15.0 55.4 22.3 22.3 
Consumer Goods 13.5 15.5 4.2 60.3 22.6 17.1 
Consumer Services 18.3 15.7 17.6 40.3 18.6 41.1 
Telecoms 18.9 18.2 5.6 65.6 17.2 17.2 
Technology 13.6 16.9 5.6 58.5 19.3      22.2 
Utilities 29.5 11.5 12.0 65.9 20.5 13.6 
Healthcare 16.0 16.8 11.0 48.2 22.6 29.2 
Oil & Gas 31.2 11.9 4.7 51.2 39.8 9.0 
Notes: This Table presents ‘Duration’ and ‘Frequency’ statistics for each of the regimes in each 
of the estimated models. Each model is estimated with the returns on the 10-year government 
bond and an equity market index. Duration is the average length of time (measured in days) for 
which a given regime persists, while ‘Frequency' is the proportion of time that the returns spend 
in each regime in the ‘steady state’. 
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Table 5. Transition Probabilities 
 
 p11 p21 p31 p12 p22 p32 p13 p23 p33 
Total 
Market 
0.946 0.051 0.003 0.038 0.927 0.035 0.006 0.133 0.861 
Financials 0.973 0.025 0.002 0.016 0.974 0.036 0.003 0.111 0.886 
Basic Mats. 0.958 0.016 0.026 0.035 0.936 0.029 0.063 0.011 0.927 
Industrials 0.952 0.026 0.022 0.062 0.927 0.011 0.058 0.009 0.934 
Cons. 
Goods 
0.927 0.017 0.056 0.037 0.935 0.028 0.210 0.025 0.765 
Cons. 
Services 
0.946 0.014 0.040 0.025 0.936 0.039 0.042 0.015 0.943 
Telecoms 0.948 0.012 0.040 0.036 0.945 0.019 0.168 0.011 0.820 
Technology 0.927 0.016 0.057 0.027 0.941 0.032 0.169 0.009 0.822 
Utilities 0.966 0.023 0.011 0.067 0.913 0.020 0.063 0.021 0.916 
Healthcare 0.937 0.020 0.043 0.035 0.940 0.025 0.076 0.014 0.910 
Oil & Gas 0.968 0.030 0.002 0.039 0.916 0.045 0.009 0.205 0.786 
Notes: This Table presents the transition probabilities for moving between the regimes in each 
application. Each row represents the 3x3 matrix of transition probabilities from the model of 
the 10-year government bond and the stated equity index. pij denotes the probability of 
moving from regime j to i. Regime 1 is the ‘Bull’ regime, 2 is the ‘Normal’ regime and 3 is 
the ‘Bear’ regime. 
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Table 6. Regime-Specific Correlations 
 
 Bull Normal Bear 
Total Market -0.0964 0.0907 0.2336 
Financials -0.1018 0.1302 0.2388 
Basic Materials -0.0902 0.4186 -0.1295 
Industrials -0.0156 0.4195 -0.2548 
Cons. Goods -0.0516 0.2695 -0.0790 
Cons. Services -0.0444 0.3294 -0.0903 
Telecoms 0.0136 0.4706 -0.2031 
Technology -0.1376 0.3640 -0.0578 
Utilities -0.0396 0.4773 -0.2117 
Healthcare -0.0508 0.2776 -0.1800 
Oil & Gas -0.1583 0.0622 0.2983 
Notes: This presents the regime-dependent pairwise correlations between long-term bonds 
and equities market generated by our MS-VAR model. 
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Figure 1. Regime Probabilities 
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Figure 2. Cross-Market Response to a Shock – Total Market Analysis 
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Figure 3. Cross-Market Response to a Shock – Sectoral Analysis 
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Figure 3. continued 
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Figure 3. continued 
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Figure 3. continued 
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Figure 4. Relative Size of Spanish Stock Market Sectors 
 
 
 
Notes: This Figure shows the proportion of the total stock market value that was attributed to 
each of the indicated sectors at the end of each year of our sample. Financials dominate the 
market, accounting for 34% of total market capitalization on average and ranging from 31% 
to 38% over our sample. Others include Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Healthcare, and 
Technology. 
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